Mike Corn, Roswell, was named the New Mexico Wool Growers, Inc.
(NMWGI) 2018 Sheepman of the Year at the association’s recent annual
meeting in Ruidoso.
“Mike Corn is a great advocate for the sheep industry, both here in
New Mexico and on the national level,” said his son Bronson Corn, NMWGI
President, Roswell. “He is an eternal optimist when it comes to the
sheep business, and works hard to protect and promote our industry and
way of life. He is a rancher, sheepman, and a family man, and we are
proud to have this opportunity to say thank you.”
The Corn family has been ranching in the Roswell area for over 135
years. A fourth-generation sheep producer, Corn raises white-faced,
fine-wool sheep – along with cattle and goats – on his family ranches,
which he operates with his son, Bronson. Corn also co-owns and manages
Roswell Wool Warehouse, marketing wool for sheep producers across the
West. Roswell Wool is now the largest wool warehouse by volume in the
United States and recently opened a second facility in Long Beach,
Calif.
Corn is an active member and past president of the NMWGI and is
currently serving as President of the American Sheep Industry
Association (ASI), the national organization that represents sheep
producers.e He is also active in the Chaves County Farm and
Livestock Bureau, the New Mexico Hereford Association, the Chaves County
Soil and Water Conservation District. Corn is also an active member
and serves on the Board of Directors of the New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association.
Corn and his wife, Jennifer, have three children: Bronson and his
wife Barbara, who live and work on the family ranch near Roswell with
their children Garrett and Madison; Jessica and her husband, Craig, who
live in Canadian, Texas, with their children Connor, Creed and Courtney;
and Jenny, who lives with her husband Travis and their two sons Tripp
and Tucker in Gladstone, New Mexico.
The NMWGI is the trade organization that has represented New Mexico’s
sheep industry for well over 100 years. Established in 1902, it is the
oldest agricultural organization in the state. For more information,
please visit www.nmagriculture.org
Monday, June 24, 2019
Friday, June 21, 2019
Senators to EPA: Stop Undermining Key Chemical Safety Law
NEWS FROM THE UNITED STATES SENATE
FOR IMMEDIATE
RELEASE: June 21, 2019
Senators to
EPA: Stop Undermining Key Chemical Safety Law
Udall, Booker, Markey,
Merkley, & Whitehouse sound the alarm as Trump admin. waters down revamped
Toxic Substances Control Act to protect chemical industry rather than public
health
Three years after overwhelming, bipartisan
passage of landmark legislation overhauling TSCA, senators raise concerns that
Trump EPA’s implementation of the law has gone dangerously off the rails
WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators
Tom Udall (D-N.M.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.) Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley
(D-Ore.), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) sounded the alarm as the Trump administration continues to
water down critical reforms to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) by
undermining or skirting key provisions that were designed to protect the
American public from exposure to dangerous chemicals. In a letter to Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Andrew Wheeler, the senators demanded
information about the EPA’s implementation of the law, which has gone
dangerously off the rails and put public health at risk.
Three years ago,
Udall, along with Booker, Markey, Merkley, and Whitehouse, led passage of bipartisan
landmark legislation, the Frank
R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, to revamp and
strengthen the badly outdated Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. Among the
reforms included in the law were key requirements to protect vulnerable
populations – including children, pregnant women, the elderly, and chemical
industry workers – and to evaluate and review the safety of all new and
existing chemicals on the market.
In their letter, the senators raised
serious concerns about several steps that the Trump EPA has taken since then to
undermine the intent of the law by weakening or openly violating critical
safeguards, including allowing chemicals onto the market without reviewing
critical information about risks to public health; abandoning its
responsibility to protect workers on the job; ignoring real-world exposure to
chemicals in our air, water, and food; and withholding public access to
critical health and safety information.
“Those
reforms were intended to address longstanding structural problems with the
original 1976 law that were broadly agreed to have stymied the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) authority to ensure that chemicals in and entering
commerce are safe for human health and the environment,” the senators wrote.
“Sadly, the implementation of the
Lautenberg Act has deviated dramatically from Congress’ intent and the new
law’s requirements,” they
continued. The senators
detailed “some of the many serious problems with the actions taken by this
Administration since January of 2017 – actions that have rendered the law’s
implementation weaker than even before the 2016 reforms.”
“Each of us contributed a great deal
of time and energy into the Congressional reform process of TSCA… [with] the
goal of restoring public trust in the federal government’s ability to protect
the public from hazardous chemicals in commerce. Three years later, we
are sorely disappointed with the direction the Administration has taken this
landmark bipartisan law,” the
senators concluded.
To address their concerns, the
senators demanded complete responses to a series of specific oversight
questions about the EPA’s failure of implementation as soon as possible.
The
full text of the letter is available below and HERE.
The Honorable
Andrew Wheeler
Administrator
U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
1200
Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington,
D.C. 20460
Dear
Mr. Administrator:
Nearly three years ago, major
reforms to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) were enacted by a strong
bipartisan majority of both Houses of Congress, in the form of the Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. Those reforms were
intended to address longstanding structural problems with the original 1976 law
that were broadly agreed to have stymied the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) authority to ensure that chemicals in and entering commerce are safe for
human health and the environment.
These problems included
debilitating constraints on EPA’s ability to obtain and require the development
of sufficient information on chemicals; the lack of a mandate for EPA to review
and make affirmative risk findings on new chemicals prior to allowing them onto
the market; the limited authority and mandate TSCA gave EPA to review the
safety of chemicals already in commerce and regulate those that present
unreasonable risk; and EPA’s inability to share much of the chemical
information it obtains with the public, or in the case of information deemed
confidential, to share such information with other levels of government and
health and environmental professionals.
The Lautenberg Act made
improvements to address each of these problems. Among the many changes:
·
Section
4: enhanced EPA’s information authorities by allowing EPA to issue orders
to obtain information and removing the original law’s requirement that EPA
first show potential risk in order to require a company to test a chemical;
·
Section
5: required EPA to make affirmative safety findings for each new
chemical, taking into account reasonably foreseen as well as intended uses of
the chemical and requiring EPA to issue binding orders on any new chemical that
“may present an unreasonable risk” or lacked sufficient information for EPA to
conduct a reasoned evaluation;
·
Section
6: required EPA to establish a continuous “pipeline” process to
prioritize existing chemicals in commerce; subject those deemed high-priority
to robust risk evaluations that account for: the full lifecycle of the
chemical; its intended, known and reasonably foreseen conditions of use; and
its potential risks to all “potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulations”
(including children and workers); and impose regulatory restrictions on any
chemical found to “present an unreasonable risk” that are sufficient to
mitigate those risks; and
·
Section
14: required companies to substantiate and EPA to review many claims for
protection from disclosure of confidential business information (CBI) and where
approved to provide that such protection generally expires after 10 years
unless a claim is reasserted and reapproved; reiterated that health and safety
studies and related information are not eligible for CBI protection, subject to
two narrow exceptions; and expanded authorized access to CBI to other levels of
government and certain health and environmental professionals.
Sadly, the implementation of
the Lautenberg Act has deviated dramatically from Congress’ intent and the new
law’s requirements. This letter describes some of the many serious
problems with the actions taken by this Administration since January of 2017 –
actions that have rendered the law’s implementation weaker than even before the
2016 reforms.
For
each of several major sections of TSCA as amended by the Lautenberg Act, we
describe what was intended under the law, and provide some examples of how
EPA’s implementation has fallen short of or deviated from that intent.
For each area of concern, we request EPA’s prompt responses to the questions
identified.
Section
4: EPA’s failure to use its enhanced information authorities under TSCA
One of the areas of greatest
bipartisan consensus in TSCA reform was the need to improve EPA’s ability to
readily obtain more robust information on chemicals, including data on exposure
pathways and extent of exposure. It is impossible to ensure the safety of
chemicals and protect human health and the environment without having solid
information about a chemical’s risks. That’s just common sense.
Under the 2016 reforms to TSCA,
EPA can now readily acquire information where needed to review new chemicals or
to prioritize or review the risks of a chemical already on the market.
The law also makes clear that EPA can require the development of real-world
exposure information.
Yet
in the nearly 3 years since passage of TSCA reform, EPA has not once used these
new authorities, and seems to be avoiding using them at all costs – even where
there are critical information gaps. For example, in a recent draft risk
evaluation for Pigment Violet 29, EPA relied exclusively on an unsupported
guesstimate from a company representative for the level of workplace exposure
to a chemical, rather than using its authority to require actual workplace
monitoring.
1. Why has EPA failed to use its information authorities?
2.
Is there a policy at the agency that discourages use of such authorities?
3.
Is there a policy for determining when such authorities are to be used?
4.
Please share any existing policies with the committee by the end of June 2019.
5.
EPA received public comments on the first 10 chemicals it is reviewing under
TSCA that identified serious information gaps. Yet EPA has already stated
publicly that it does not intend to use these authorities for any of the first
10 chemicals. Please explain this decision.
a. Has EPA documented the basis for its decision
not to rely on these authorities with respect to the first 10 chemicals?
b.
If so,
please provide documents related to this decision.
6.
Has EPA considered using any of these information authorities when assessing a
new chemical since passage of the Lautenberg Act?
a.
If so,
please provide any documentation related to those decisions.
b.
If not,
why EPA has not considered using its information authorities when assessing any
of the approximately 2,500 new chemical submissions it has reviewed over this
time period?
c.
Has EPA
requested or required—and received—any vertebrate animal or non/vertebrate or
non-animal toxicity information?
The law’s vertebrate animal testing provisions in no way limit
EPA’s testing authorities; they simply call for EPA to rely on methods not
involving vertebrate animals where such methods can provide information of
equivalent or better scientific quality and relevance than vertebrate animal
tests.
7.
Does EPA consider that the law in any manner constrains EPA’s authority to
request or require testing if the needed test is an animal test? If so,
please indicate where such a constraint is stated in the law.
8.
Has EPA requested or required the use of any tests, whether involving
vertebrate animals or not, using its section 4 authorities since passage of the
Lautenberg Act?
9.
In order for the public to understand how EPA’s use of its information
authorities affects the information that EPA receives, when and how will EPA
make publicly available any:
a.
voluntary
exposure and toxicity information it receives for new or existing chemicals,
b.
any
requests or requirements EPA issues regarding new or existing chemicals, and
c.
exposure
or toxicity information it receives as a result of such requests or
requirements?
10.
EPA has stated that the agency intends to rely principally or entirely on voluntary
submissions of information.
a.
Please
describe any steps that the EPA has taken to that it obtains all reasonably
available information through voluntary submissions.
b.
Please
describe any steps that the EPA has taken to ensure that all companies with
relevant information choose to provide information.
c.
Please
describe any steps that the EPA has taken to ensure that companies do not
choose not to provide information that is unfavorable to their chemicals or
that they for some other reason do not wish to provide EPA or have be made
public.
11.
Does EPA have a written policy or procedure to prevent receiving only
incomplete or biased information when relying solely on voluntary
submissions? If so, please provide them.
Section 5,
part 1: EPA’s failure to protect workers when reviewing new chemicals
under TSCA
Congress gave EPA authority to
regulate chemicals that may present risks to workers when TSCA was first
enacted in 1976. Bipartisan TSCA reform in 2016 strengthened this
authority by explicitly naming workers as a “potentially exposed or susceptible
subpopulation” and requiring that EPA consider and address potential risks to
workers when assessing new or existing chemicals.
Every year, industry submits
1,000 or so new chemical notices that EPA must review before the chemicals can
enter the market. As part of this review, Congress told EPA to determine
whether any of these chemicals “may present an unreasonable risk” to workers,
using TSCA’s health standard, which is much more stringent than the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) workplace
standards. Where potential risks to workers are identified under TSCA,
EPA must mitigate or eliminate those risks.
Unfortunately, EPA is failing
to carry out the law and is putting the health of American workers in
jeopardy. Even where EPA finds a new chemical does or may present serious
risks to workers, the agency is allowing that chemical onto the market without
imposing any conditions to protect the workers. EPA’s only justification
for this is that it simply “expects” that workers will protect themselves from
harmful workplace exposures by wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) that
the company is not required to provide or train workers to use properly.
In doing this, EPA is deferring to OSHA regulations that allow workers to be
exposed to chemical risks that are a thousand or more times higher than are
acceptable under TSCA.
12.
Why is EPA failing to carry out its duty to ensure workers are protected under
TSCA, and is instead deferring to the much weaker health standards and
regulations of OSHA?
13.
On what legal basis is EPA allowing, without any conditions or restrictions,
new chemicals onto the market that may present risk to workers, when the law
clearly requires EPA to regulate such chemicals?
a.
What
actual evidence does the agency have that American workers will be sufficiently
protected once these chemicals are on the market?
14.
Please promptly provide us with your new chemicals decision-making policies
that set forth the legal basis for your decisions regarding worker safety,
along with any evidence that workers are being sufficiently protected under
your approach. If you lack any such written policies or evidence, please
explain why EPA has consistently applied this approach to so many of its recent
new chemicals decisions?
Section 5,
part 2: EPA’s failure to adequately identify and review “reasonably
foreseen” conditions of use when reviewing new chemicals under TSCA
When reviewing a new chemical,
EPA is directed by statute to examine the chemical under its “conditions of
use,” defined in TSCA as “the circumstances, as determined by the
Administrator, under which a chemical substance is intended, known, or
reasonably foreseen to be manufactured, processed, distributed in commerce,
used, or disposed of.” In the context of new chemicals, Congress’s
inclusion of a requirement for EPA to examine “reasonably foreseen” activities
is particularly noteworthy. Where EPA determines that a new chemical “is
not likely to present an unreasonable risk” and the notifying company commences
manufacture, that chemical is then placed on the TSCA Inventory and other
companies can make or use that chemical at will without any notification to or
review by EPA. Such a chemical may be produced or used in amounts or in
ways that the original company did not intend at the time it first notified EPA
of the new chemical. The risks of these additional activities, in
combination with those from the originally intended activities, could well
increase to a point where EPA would find that the chemical “presents” or “may
present” an unreasonable risk. Hence it is vital that EPA consider both
intended and reasonably foreseen activities in its initial review.
Unfortunately, EPA has attempted
to skirt this requirement for an integrated assessment of both intended and
reasonably foreseen conditions of use in several ways that are contrary to what
TSCA requires:
·
For most
new chemicals EPA has reviewed in recent months, it simply asserts there are no
such reasonably foreseen uses.
·
For most
of the small subset of such new chemicals where EPA does identify a reasonably
foreseen use, it merely states without providing any analysis that it expects
that use to present no greater risk than the intended use. By doing this,
EPA not only fails to demonstrate that the reasonably foreseen use is not
likely to present an unreasonable risk; it also fails to consider that the
combination of use could present such a risk.
·
For the
remaining few new chemicals where EPA does identify a reasonably foreseen use
and identifies some potential concern with that use, EPA has separately
promulgated a Significant New Use Rule (SNUR) that requires a company to notify
EPA prior to engaging in that reasonably foreseen use. However, in these
SNURs, EPA has not made clear that it would assess the potential exposure and
risks from that use in combination with the already approved intended uses as
part of its review of any such notice.
None of these recent policy
changes to EPA’s examination of new chemicals’ conditions of use has been made
public or subject to a public comment opportunity. While certain aspects
of the third case outlined above appear to mirror aspects of EPA’s November
2017 “decision-making framework” that was subject to public comment, EPA has
never responded to those public comments, and when a lawsuit challenged that
earlier framework, EPA did not apply the framework until the lawsuit was
dismissed, apparently to evade judicial review of the framework.
15.
Why has EPA implemented these new “reasonably foreseen” policies for months now
without publicly describing them and allowing the public an opportunity to
comment on them?
16.
We expect that EPA has put its new policies and procedures in writing for
internal use. Please provide us with copies. If written copies are not
available, please explain how EPA is making decisions concerning new chemicals
without such written policies.
17.
What are EPA’s plans to publish and take public comment on its current
decision-making framework, including the legal and scientific justifications
for it?
18.
On what statutory basis does EPA believe it has authority to separate its
consideration of potential risks arising from intended vs. reasonably foreseen
conditions of use of a new chemical, given TSCA’s clear mandate that they be
assessed together?
Section 6: EPA’s failure to assess even known conditions of
use and pathways of exposure in conducting risk evaluations of existing
chemicals under TSCA
The 2016 reforms to TSCA
strengthened EPA’s authority and mandate to conduct comprehensive, robust
evaluations of potential risks posed by chemicals in commerce. As
mentioned above, EPA is required to determine whether a chemical substance, as
a whole, presents an unreasonable risk under its conditions of use. To do
so, EPA must evaluate potential risks arising from activities across the entire
lifecycle of a chemical, and it must consider all “known” and “reasonably
foreseen” circumstances, not just those “intended” by a company making or using
a chemical.
Yet EPA has sought in numerous
ways to limit the scope of its risk evaluations and risk determinations.
First, in its final Risk Evaluation Rule, EPA reversed course from its
proposed rule and asserted sweeping authority to pick and choose what
activities and what exposures it includes in its risk evaluation of a
chemical. EPA claimed it could ignore any exposure to a chemical that
also falls under the authority of another agency, such as OSHA, regardless of
whether that agency has actually taken any action to mitigate the risks of the
chemical. EPA also stated that it will exclude what it called “legacy”
activities associated with a chemical. Even when a chemical is still
being used or disposed of, EPA asserted that it could ignore exposures from
those “legacy” activities if a chemical was not being actively manufactured for
those uses. For example, EPA will ignore known exposures to: flame
retardants that have been voluntarily phased out but are still present in
millions of items of furniture still in active use; and to asbestos in
insulation that remains in place in millions of homes, schools and other
buildings. EPA will not only be ignoring exposures that clearly
contribute to ongoing risks, it will do so even where no law or regulation
prevents companies from resuming production of a chemical that has been
voluntarily phased out.
But EPA has not stopped
there. It has already begun to conduct risk evaluations that exclude most
or all pathways of exposure to a chemical that fall under the jurisdiction of
another statute that EPA administers. This means EPA will not account for
the human health or environmental risks of releases and exposures to chemicals
in air, surface, ground or drinking water, or wastes, no matter how they are
disposed of. Not only will EPA ignore the contribution to overall
exposure of environmental releases that are actually regulated under another law;
it will also do so when no regulation has been issued at all for a chemical
under another law--merely because EPA could in principle regulate the chemical
in the future.
The magnitude of the exposures EPA is zeroing out of its risk evaluations is enormous. For just seven of the first 10 chemicals undergoing risk evaluations under TSCA, EPA’s own data indicate that 66 million pounds are released every year to the air, water and land – even after accounting for any regulations of these chemicals in place under another law.
The magnitude of the exposures EPA is zeroing out of its risk evaluations is enormous. For just seven of the first 10 chemicals undergoing risk evaluations under TSCA, EPA’s own data indicate that 66 million pounds are released every year to the air, water and land – even after accounting for any regulations of these chemicals in place under another law.
Finally, while TSCA requires
EPA to determine whether a chemical as a whole, not individual uses of a
chemical, poses an unreasonable risk, EPA has asserted that it can make
use-by-use determinations of no unreasonable risk, without ever considering the
combined exposures from multiple uses of the same chemical.
All of these assertions of
authority are contrary to both the letter and the spirit of reformed TSCA,
which was intended to ensure that EPA’s chemical risk assessments accounted for
chemical exposures in the real world, where people are exposed to chemicals at
work and at home, and through air, water and food as well as through the use of
products.
19.
How does EPA’s exclusion of known uses and exposures to chemicals represent use
of the “best available science,” as required under TSCA section 26(h)?
20.
How is EPA complying with TSCA section 26(k)’s requirement that EPA consider
all reasonably available information when EPA ignores known uses and exposures
to chemicals?
21.
Please identify the specific language in TSCA that authorizes EPA to make risk
determinations on individual uses of a chemical, rather than on the chemical as
a whole, thereby not accounting for the potential for people or the environment
to be exposed to a chemical in multiple ways.
22.
Please identify the specific language in TSCA that authorizes EPA not to
account for exposures from use or disposal of a chemical where that chemical is
not currently manufactured for such a use.
23.
How will EPA ensure that it meets its obligation under TSCA to protect against
unreasonable risk, including risk to vulnerable subpopulations, if it defers to
other agencies or EPA-administered statutes that use health standards that
differ significantly from TSCA’s and do not require protection of vulnerable
subpopulations?
24.
While EPA has announced these policies in its final framework rule and risk
evaluation scopes and problem formulations, EPA has provided relatively little
explanation of the legal basis for these approaches. Does EPA have a more
robust legal analysis justifying these approaches? If so, please provide
it/them.
Section
14: EPA’s failure to provide timely public access to non-confidential
information and access by eligible parties to confidential business information
under TSCA
A key aim of TSCA even as
originally enacted in 1976 was to ensure there is adequate information available
on the potential health and environmental effects of chemicals. Congress
clearly identified this aim in the first item articulated in TSCA’s policy
section 2(b)(1). TSCA also called on EPA to play a central role in
providing broad access to such information on chemicals, while protecting
legitimate confidential business information (CBI). Both roles are
specified in TSCA section 14.
The 2016 TSCA amendments made
major changes to section 14, enhancing requirements for companies’ assertion
and substantiation, and EPA’s review, of CBI claims; for providing public
access to chemical information; and for providing expanded access to CBI:
·
CBI
claims must be asserted at the time information is submitted to EPA.
Except for certain specific types of information, all CBI claims must also be
substantiated at that time.
·
Health
and safety studies and their underlying information are not eligible for CBI
protection, subject to two narrow exceptions.
·
EPA must
review all CBI claims made to protect a chemical’s identity, and at least 25%
of all other types of CBI claims, except for those specifically exempted from
substantiation. EPA must conduct its review and make a determination on
each CBI claim within 90 days of its receipt. Any claim approved expires
after 10 years unless reasserted and reviewed and approved by EPA.
·
A public
“unique identifier” must be assigned to any confidential chemical identity and
used to “tag” all other information EPA has or receives on that chemical.
·
Subject
to certain conditions, EPA is to provide access to CBI by state, local and
tribal governments, associated health and environmental professionals, medical
personnel and first responders.
·
EPA is
to establish a “request and notification system” to provide “expedient and
swift access” to CBI by government-associated health and environmental
professionals, medical personnel and first responders.
These provisions of amended
TSCA were immediately effective. Yet nearly three years after enactment,
there is little evidence that EPA is effectively implementing these provisions
or requiring compliance with them. Foremost among our concerns is EPA’s
failure to provide any means for the public to know about and have confidence
in the extent of EPA CBI reviews, the determinations being reached, and the
provision of access to information the law requires be provided. Some
specific examples are listed below:
·
EPA has
provided no public accounting of how many CBI claims it has received and for
what types of information; how many claims it has reviewed and within what
timeframe; or the outcomes of any of the claim reviews it has conducted.
·
While
section 26(j) of TSCA requires EPA to make all of its determinations public,
EPA has yet to do so for even a single CBI claim determination.
·
Last
December, EPA for the first time published a list of “unique identifiers” it
had assigned to chemicals for the identities of which it had approved CBI
claims. The list contained only 157 entries, and the most recent
assignment dated back to August 2017, more than 18 months ago. Yet EPA
has allowed the identities of hundreds of additional chemicals to be hidden
from the public without assigning a unique identifier. For example, as of
the end of January of this year, EPA had failed to assign a unique identifier
to at least 270 new chemicals that have commenced manufacture and that are
identified only by a generic name indicating EPA has allowed the specific name
to be kept confidential.
·
EPA
appears to have made no progress at all toward establishing the “request and
notification system” required under TSCA section 14(g)(3). That system is
vital to ensuring that government-associated health and environmental
professionals, medical personnel and first responders can gain access to
confidential information they need to do their jobs.
Meanwhile,
EPA has withheld health and safety studies or their underlying information from
the public pertaining to the first chemical subject to a risk evaluation under
TSCA, called Pigment Violet 29. Initially EPA erroneously asserted that
such information was eligible for CBI protection under TSCA and was being
withheld from the public on that basis. When that argument was rebutted,
EPA acknowledged it had erred – but then came up with a different legal theory
for withholding information that Congress clearly intended be publicly
accessible.
Stakeholders
report that when they have raised concerns about many of these issues to EPA
staff, they have repeatedly been told that the agency does not have sufficient
resources to carry out its duties under section 14. Yet comments received
by the agency on its proposed user fee rule pointed to EPA’s severe
underestimation of its costs for implementing these requirements of amended
TSCA and urged EPA both to provide a fuller accounting of its expenses and to
increase the amount of fees it was to collect to help offset these costs.
Despite these concerns being voiced, EPA made no changes either to its cost
estimate or to its fee structure.
25.
When can we expect to see real progress in the agency’s meeting its duties
under TSCA section 14? Specifically:
a.
When
will EPA provide a public accounting of how many CBI claims it has received and
for what types of information; how many claims it has reviewed and within what
timeframe; and the outcomes of (i.e., determinations on) the claim reviews it
has conducted, as required?
b.
b. When
will EPA make public a current and complete list of “unique identifiers” for
chemical identities for which EPA has approved CBI claims, which are essential
for the public to identify other information EPA has on those chemicals?
c.
c. When
will government-associated health and environmental professionals, medical
personnel and first responders be able to access the confidential information
they need to do their jobs through the “request and notification system” for
CBI access required under TSCA?
d.
d. When
will EPA make public health and safety studies and associated information on
chemicals, which are not eligible for protection as CBI under TSCA?
Each
of us contributed a great deal of time and energy into the Congressional reform
process of TSCA with a wide variety of stakeholders from the environmental,
health and business sectors. We all had the goal of restoring public
trust in the federal government’s ability to protect the public from hazardous
chemicals in commerce. Three years later, we are sorely disappointed with
the direction the Administration has taken this landmark bipartisan law.
Your response to these questions in a timely manner would be appreciated so we
can begin the process of turning implementation of the new TSCA in the right
direction.
Respectfully,
###
Contacts: Ned Adriance (Udall), 202.228.6870 / Kristin
Lynch (Booker), 202.597.4071 / Giselle Barry (Markey) 202.224.2742 / Martina
McLennan (Merkley), 202.224.3753 / Meaghan McCabe (Whitehouse), 401.453.5294
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)